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Financial Literacy, Schooling, and Wealth Accumulation  
 
Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell, Cindy K. Soo, and David Bravo 
  
Traditional economic theory posits that forward-looking individuals maximize expected 
lifetime utility using economic information to accumulate and then decumulate wealth 
effectively over their lifetimes.  Yet survey evidence reveals that fewer than half of U.S. workers 
have even attempted to estimate how much money they might need in retirement, and many 
older adults face significant retirement saving shortfalls (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007a and b; 
Mitchell and Moore 1998; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun 2006). Numerous economic 
explanations for these phenomena have been suggested including dispersion in discount rates, 
risk aversion, and credit constraints, but the empirical literature exploring such factors thus far 
has been unable to account for much of the observed differentials in wealth (Bernheim, Skinner, 
and Weinberg, 2001; Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro, 1997).  
The present study seeks to evaluate whether people who find it difficult to understand 
their financial environment are also less likely to accumulate wealth. Specifically, we examine 
the links between financial literacy, by which we mean the ability to process economic 
information and make informed decisions about household finances, and wealth accumulation 
and pension contributions. Previous studies have reported strong correlations between financial 
literacy and asset accumulation as well as retirement planning.1
                                                 
1 For instance, Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverley (2003) show that more financially knowledgeable US respondents are 
also more likely to engage in a wide range of recommended financial practices; Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, b) find 
that more financially literate elderly U.S. respondents are also more likely to plan, to succeed in planning, and to 
invest in complex assets; and Campbell (2006) reports that more educated Swedish households also diversify their 
portfolios more efficiently. Cole, Sampson, and Zia (2009) find that the financially more literate are more likely to 
have bank accounts in India and Indonesia. 
 These findings have prompted 
policymakers to support efforts to enhance household wealth accumulation and welfare through 
increasing financial literacy. For instance, the U.S. President’s Advisory Council on Financial 
Literacy recently stated that (PACFL, 2008, np):  "While the crisis has many causes, it is 
undeniable that financial illiteracy is one of the root causes... Sadly, far too many Americans do 
not have the basic financial skills necessary to develop and maintain a budget, to understand 
credit, to understand investment vehicles, or to take advantage of our banking system. It is 
essential to provide basic financial education that allows people to better navigate an economic 
crisis such as this one.” Similarly, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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(OECD nd) has recently launched a major initiative to “identify individuals who are most in need 
of financial education and the best ways to improve that education.”  
Despite these and other enthusiastic endorsements for programs to boost financial 
literacy, questions have been raised about whether these associations reflect causality (Lusardi 
and Mitchell, 2008, 2010).  For example, individuals who fail to save also may be financially 
illiterate due to some underlying and usually unobservable factor such as impatience, making it 
difficult to assess whether boosting financial education would, in fact, enhance household wealth 
accumulation. Moreover, in simple bivariate associations of financial literacy with wealth, 
financial literacy might be proxying, in part, for other factors such as schooling attainment.  
Empirical measures of financial literacy are also likely to have considerable measurement error 
that, ceteris paribus, is likely to bias standard estimates of the impacts of financial literacy 
towards zero.  Instrumental variable (IV) estimates in principle can control for both the 
unobserved variable and the random measurement error biases, and schooling attainment can be 
included in the same specification to control for the possibility that financial literacy proxies for 
schooling.  To our knowledge, however, no studies have yet used IV methods to estimate the 
impact of financial literacy and schooling attainment on wealth, as we do here.2
In what follows, we draw on a unique microeconomic dataset, the Chilean Social 
Protection Survey, to explore how financial literacy and schooling attainment influence wealth.
  
3 
This dataset includes extensive information on household wealth as well as individual and 
household characteristics for a representative sample of prime-age adults, permitting us to 
evaluate the effects of financial literacy using a richer range of ages and schooling than 
heretofore available.4
                                                 
2 Some studies have looked at related issues using IV methods. For instance, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) test the 
possible causal effect of wealth on financial planning using changes in regional housing prices as an instrument for 
wealth, but they limit their study to older respondents in the U.S. Health and Retirement Study and do not consider 
the possible impact of financial literacy on wealth as we do in this study.  Bernheim, Garrett, and Maki (2001), Cole 
and Shastry (2009), and Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) investigate how changes in U.S. schooling laws and state 
mandates requiring schools to offer financial literacy relate to financial market participation, but these studies do not 
focus on wealth accumulation as we do here. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) explore instruments for planning 
by U.S. respondents but they are silent on the role of financial literacy. 
 Using a set of plausibly exogenous instrumental variables that satisfy 
critical diagnostic tests to isolate the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling attainment 
3 The Social Protection Survey is described at 
www.microdatos.cl/interior_areasMT.php?id_s=2&id_ss=2&id_proy=1 
4 Ameriks et al. (2003) examine highly-educated TIAA-CREF survey participants; Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a) use 
Health and Retirement Study respondents over age 50. In contrast, the dataset we use below is a nationally 
representative sample of men age 24-65 and women age 24-60. 
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on wealth, we show that both financial literacy and schooling attainment are positively 
associated with wealth outcomes. Moreover, our IV estimates indicate even stronger effects of 
financial literacy on wealth than suggested by OLS models, while the opposite is true for 
schooling in linear specifications; interactive specifications imply that both schooling and 
financial literacy have significant positive effects.  
Our results are relevant for financial educational policy in that we find that improved 
financial literacy can make a significant difference for financial behavior, even after controlling 
for schooling. This rigorous analysis of the impact of financial literacy on wealth accumulation 
should be useful in informing governments and their policy advisers around the world, as they 
consider new initiatives for financial education.5
 
  
Empirical Framework 
 Several prior studies have shown that financial literacy and schooling are significantly 
correlated with positive financial behavior, but few have controlled for (usually) unobserved 
factors such as risk aversion, self-esteem, innate ability, intelligence, and motivation that may 
shape the relationship between financial literacy and financial behaviors.6
                                                 
5 For instance the World Bank and the Russian Federation have recently announced a multi-million dollar, multi-
year collaborative to improve financial literacy in low- and middle-income countries (see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTEDUCATION/0,,contentMDK:21936796~menuPK:2643854~pa
gePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:282386,00.html) 
 For this reason, it is 
difficult to conclude, based on the scientific evidence, that improvements in financial literacy 
actually enhance financial planning and saving, or whether, instead, wealth and financial literacy 
are both the result of some other unobserved factors. For this reason, analyses that do not control 
for such unobserved factors may be vulnerable to biases in the estimated effects of schooling and 
financial literacy on financial wellbeing.  Moreover, empirical indicators of schooling and 
financial literacy are noisy measures, and as is well-known, random measurement error in right-
side variables tends to bias their coefficient estimates towards zero.  Estimates of noise-to-signal 
ratios for schooling attainment are often about 10 percent (Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; 
Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994), producing a bias towards zero of almost that 
magnitude.  Measures of financial literacy are likely subject to greater measurement errors, and 
6 Both Lusardi (2003) and Ameriks et al. (2003) use IV strategies, but they focus on financial planning rather than 
financial literacy. 
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thus, greater biases.  Instrumental variable estimates are one way to eliminate the attenuation bias 
towards zero due to measurement error. 
Our goal is to assess whether wealth accruals could be enhanced with greater financial 
literacy and schooling. Suppose the true relationship between financial literacy, schooling, and 
wealth could be described for the ith person as: 
 Wi =β0 +β1FLi +β2Si +β3FLi *Si +β4Ci +β5Ei + εi , (1) 
where wealth Wi depends linearly on financial literacy FLi, schooling Si, their interaction FLi *Si, 
other observed individual characteristics Ci, unobserved individual characteristics Ei, and 
unobserved random shocks εi.  We include in relation (1) both linear terms in FLi and Si and their 
interaction. We include the interaction because it is possible that the effects of financial literacy 
FL depend on the level of schooling Si and vice versa.  This coefficient of this interaction term 
may be positive if financial literacy FLi and schooling Si are complements and reinforce each 
other or negative if they are substitutes in determination of wealth accumulation.  Below we 
consider three variants of relation (1):   
(1a) only linear terms,7
(1b) both the linear and interaction terms, and  
  
(1c) only the interaction term.  
  Equation (1) posits that there are no other endogenous variables beyond financial literacy 
and schooling that directly determine wealth.  For example, the time one devotes to schoolwork 
and how that time is divided between arithmetic and other topics might affect wealth, but our 
assumption is that such effects are indirect via financial literacy and schooling.  Likewise, there 
could be other behavioral channels through which FLi and Si affect Wi.  For instance, part of the 
effects on wealth may work through choosing to contribute more to pensions, or by increasing 
understanding of business news and market predictions.  Estimating equation (1) does not 
illuminate such possibilities, though formulations similar to equation (1) but using some saving 
pathway as the dependent variable could illuminate the roles of FLi and Si in determining the 
relevant mechanism. In what follows, we offer analysis of two such pathways, the density of 
pension contributions and whether the individual attempted to calculate money needed for 
retirement.   
                                                 
7 We also consider two sub-variants of the linear case with only financial literacy or only schooling. 
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  We further posit that financial literacy and schooling are determined by observed 
personal characteristics Ci* (that may overlap with Ci), some factors in C* and Xi  that affect 
learning and schooling but do not directly affect Wi , unobserved individual characteristics Ei, 
and error terms ui and vi:8
FLi =η0 +η1Ci* +η2Xi +η3Ei + ui    (2) 
  
Si =α0 +α1Ci* +α2Xi +α3Ei + vi    (3) 
In general, for consistent estimates of the coefficients of interest, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression requires that the covariance between the disturbance terms in equations (1) and (2) 
and (1) and (3) be zero: that is, there can be no unobserved factors that are correlated with 
financial literacy or schooling but also affect the outcome of interest Wi. Nevertheless, the 
unobserved individual factors vector Ei appears in the compound disturbance terms for all 
relations, implying that OLS estimates are likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. The 
direction of the bias depends on whether the true values of β5 and η3 (and similarly, of β5 and α3) 
have the same or the opposite signs.  For example, if the unobserved factor is ability that 
positively affects financial literacy and also directly positively affects wealth, both β5 and η3 are 
positive and OLS estimates of β1 are biased upward, overestimating the magnitude and 
significance of financial literacy as a determinant of wealth. Conversely, if some unobserved 
factor such as innate caution produced greater investment in financial literacy, but ceteris 
paribus reduced wealth due to too great caution in investment behavior, OLS estimates of β1 are 
biased downward, underestimating the magnitude and significance of financial literacy as a 
determinant of wealth accumulation. In addition to the possibility of such omitted variable 
biases, financial literacy and schooling measures are potentially subject to measurement error as 
noted above, which would tend to bias OLS estimates towards zero. 
                                                 
8 We also could include another equation parallel to (2) and (3) for the interaction, but since the points made here for 
the case in which FLi and Si enter in equation (1a) only linearly carry over to the case with the interaction, we limit 
this discussion to the simpler case in which they only enter linearly.  We have written equations (2) and (3) as if FLi 
and Si have the same determinants except for ui and vi, which are likely to be correlated (perhaps perfectly 
correlated).  This is the usual setup in household models if decisions regarding FLi and Si are made at the same time 
– in principle, all concurrent decisions are made in light of all the variables that determine household behaviors – 
though, of course, the coefficients could differ and some may not be significantly different from zero.  If decisions 
are made at different times, the right-side determinants in equations (2) and (3) may differ; for example, some 
expectations that determine the earlier decision could be replaced by realized outcomes that occurred prior to the 
later decision.  Our microeconomic dataset, like most, does not permit empirical representations of such 
possibilities.  
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  A similar point holds with regard to estimates that include only FLi or only Si – one at at a 
time – if the true relation is actually equation (1a) with both entering linearly.9  Equations (2) and 
(3) show that it is highly likely that FLi and Si are correlated because their determinants are 
basically the same.10
To handle this problem, we use an IV approach with robust standard errors to estimate 
the three variants of equation (1) in light of (2) and (3), seeking to isolate the causal effects of 
financial literacy and schooling, and to control for random measurement errors.  Good 
instruments are ones that are sufficiently correlated with financial literacy FLi and with schooling 
Si, but that are independent of unobserved effects in equation (1) determining wealth. The Xi 
vector and elements of the Ci* vector excluded from Ci in equations (2) and (3) refer to such 
instruments.  For the IV estimation, we begin by estimating the “first stage” determinants of 
financial literacy and schooling in (2) and (3); next we use these estimates to predict financial 
literacy and schooling and employ them in the “second stage” estimate of equation (1). Note that 
with the above assumptions, predicted financial literacy and predicted schooling are independent 
of the compound error term in (1).  Therefore, if equation (1) is the true relation, the IV or two-
stage least squares procedure leads to consistent estimates of β1 and β2.   
 Accordingly, if the true relation is equation (1a) with both FLi and Si 
entering linearly but analysts include either FLi or Si, the coefficient estimate for the included 
variable is biased because it is correlated with the excluded factor.  
In what follows, we utilize a set of plausible instruments and diagnostic tests to determine 
whether our instruments are (a) sufficiently strong (using F tests for excluded instruments, 
Angrist-Pische multivariate F tests for excluded instruments, and the Kleibergen-Paap weak 
identification tests), and (b) independent of the second-stage compound disturbance term (β4Ei + 
εi) using the Hansen J statistic overidentification test.11
                                                 
9 Some other endogenous variable Yi might also be included in equation (1)  but our maintained hypothesis for our 
estimates, as in other instrumental variable estimates, if that this is not the case.  
  Our candidate instruments, on which we 
elaborate below, include (1) age-related factors such as governmental policies and 
10 It is possible but highly unlikely in such household models that the coefficients of the variables in equations (2) 
and (3) differ so that financial literacy and schooling are orthogonal.  
11 There recently has been what Stock (2010) calls a “transformation” in econometric tools for making inferences, 
including development of some of the diagnostic tools that we use here(see Stock (2010) and the references therein).  
As is well-known, the J statistic only tests the overidentifying restrictions, not the exogeneity of all the first-stage 
instruments (e.g., Stock and Watson 2007, Wooldridge 2002).  As also is well known  (e.g. Wooldridge 2002), the 
failure to reject the null in overidentification tests may be because the test has low power for detecting the 
endogeneity of some of the instruments.  As discussed below, however, in our case, the overidentification test does 
have power to reject a number of candidate instruments.  
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macroeconomic conditions, (2) family background, and (3) personality traits. We find that many 
of these candidates are good by conventional criteria. Nevertheless, some are insufficiently 
strong predictors of the endogenous FLi and Si right-side variables, and some are not independent 
of the second-stage disturbance term.  Therefore, arguably, this latter group should be included 
as controls in the second-stage relation (i.e., in the vector Ci in relation 1). 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our primary data source is the Social Protection Survey (Encuesta de Protecion Social, 
EPS) administered by us in collaboration with the Microdata Center of the University of Chile 
(Arenas et al., 2008; Bravo et al. 2004, 2006, 2010). This survey is comparable to the U.S. 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) that provides a nationally-representative stratified random 
survey on respondents over the age of 50, covering, inter alia, their wealth, schooling, financial 
literacy, work history, childhood background, and selected personality traits. In contrast to the 
HRS, however, the EPS covers all adults, not just respondents over age 50. In what follows, we 
limit our attention to 13,054 prime-age respondents surveyed in 2006, namely men age 24-65 
and women age 24-60 (since in Chile the legal retirement age is 60 for women but 65 years for 
men).  As noted below, we also have linked these data to some information on policies, markets 
and macroeconomic conditions at critical junctures in respondents’ lives. 
Wealth and Pension Contribution Outcomes:  Our outcomes of interest are components of net 
wealth, drawing on four EPS measures summarized in Table 1 (wealth in US$2006): 
• Pension wealth averages $38,600 or 54 percent of total net wealth, though with 
considerable variance across respondents and about a quarter (25 percent) of 
respondents have zero pension wealth.  In 1981, the Chilean government terminated 
the old insolvent pay-as-you-go retirement system and replaced it with a national, 
mandatory defined-contribution scheme known as the AFP system (Mitchell, Todd, 
and Bravo, 2008). This reform required all new formal sector employees to contribute 
at least 10 percent of their salaries to one of several licensed defined contribution 
pension funds.12
                                                 
12 Those who started working prior to 1980 could elect to join the new scheme or remain covered by the previous 
system.  
 We believe that pension wealth is likely to be relatively accurately 
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reported in Chile because respondents receive annual statements from the government 
summarizing their defined contribution pension system accruals.   
• Net housing wealth averages $22,100 or 31 percent of total wealth, again with 
considerable variance across respondents (though with a standard deviation only 
about half as large as for pension wealth despite a greater range); about a quarter (26 
percent) of respondents report none and 1 percent report negative net housing wealth. 
We calculate net housing wealth based on self-reported data on market values (either 
for sale or for rent) minus estimated mortgage debt.  Our measure of housing wealth 
is probably noisier than our measure of pension wealth and some of the other wealth 
components. 
• Other net wealth averages $10,600 or 15 percent of total net wealth, with greater 
variance across respondents than either pension or housing wealth but again about a 
quarter (25 percent) of respondents report zero and more (31 percent) report negative 
values.  We calculated other net wealth by summing self-reported business wealth, 
agricultural assets, other real estate assets, and financial investments and subtracting 
all forms of household debt.  This other net wealth measure probably also is a noisier 
than the measure of pension wealth. 
• Total net wealth averages $71,500, with greater variance and greater range than the 
other wealth measures just described.  Total net wealth is the sum of the three 
components above.  
Table 1 here 
In addition to these wealth measures, we also explore two possible channels via which 
financial literacy and schooling might affect particularly pension wealth. The first is the “density 
of pension contributions.”  This concept refers to the fraction of months each individual 
contributed to the pension system, from age 18 to the survey date, and therefore is indicative of 
how attached the worker is to the pension saving system. We derive this measure by tracking 
respondent self-reports of the number of months they worked in covered jobs over time and 
contributed to a pension fund, compared to the number of months when they could have 
contributed. On average respondents report that they contributed to their pension almost half the 
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time they were eligible to do so, though there is again wide dispersion over the sample.13
• Have you attempted to calculate the money needed in order to retire? [yes/no] 
 About 
10 percent of individuals contributed all of the available time, while 17 percent report they never 
contributed. The second channel that we explore is a retirement planning indicator of whether the 
individual has attempted to calculate the money he or she needs for retirement. The survey 
question for this retirement planning variable is as follows: 
We create a dummy indicator in which 1 indicates a yes response, and 0 represents a negative 
response. 
Explanatory Variables: Schooling and Financial Literacy:    Our key explanatory variables are 
schooling attainment and financial literacy. Schooling attainment is measured in a fairly 
conventional manner (e.g., Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd 2010), with primary school 
referring to grades 1-8, secondary school to grades 9-13, and post-secondary school to grades 
beyond that, to a maximum of 20.  The average schooling attainment in our sample (see Table 2) 
is 10.4 grades, with a standard deviation of 3.9 grades.  Only about one percent of the 
respondents have no schooling, and about the same fraction has the maximum of 20 years.    
Table 2 here. 
Financial literacy is measured using a rich set of 12 questions. The first three ‘core’ 
questions cover basic economics and finance including an understanding of risk and simple 
interest; the second more ‘sophisticated’ set of three pertains to more elaborate financial 
concepts; and a third set of six covers knowledge of retirement system rules including the legal 
retirement age and how to calculate AFP pension benefits.   
The “core” first three financial literacy queries were developed and implemented in the 
HRS (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007c); they have also been adopted by several other international 
surveys.  They are as follows: 
• If the chance of catching an illness is 10 percent, how many people out of 1000 would get the 
illness? 
• If 5 people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is 2 Million pesos, how much 
would each receive? 
• Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate you earn on this money 
is 2 percent a year. If you keep this money in the account for 5 years, how much would you 
have after 5 years? [more than $120, exactly $120, less than $120] 
 
                                                 
13 Our density estimates conform to those reported in Arenas et al. (2008). 
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The second more sophisticated set of three questions has also been fielded in a special HRS 
module (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2009) intending to measure more complex concepts such as 
compound interest, inflation, and risk diversification. The specific questions are: 
• Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the interest rate that you earn on these 
savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in the account after 2 years? [exact 
number] 
• Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate that you earn on these 
savings is 1 percent a year. Inflation is 2 percent a year. After one year, if you withdraw the 
money from the savings account you could buy more/less/the same? 
• T/F: Buying shares in one company is less risky than buying shares from many different 
companies with the same money. 
 
The third set of questions is specific to the EPS, and it touches on some of the key aspects of the 
Chilean retirement system focusing on the mandatory contribution rate, the legal retirement age 
for women and men, how pension benefits are computed in the defined contribution system, 
whether people are aware of the government’s welfare benefit for the elderly, and whether 
people know they can contribute to the Voluntary Pension system even when they are not in 
covered-sector jobs. The specific wording of these questions is: 
• Do you know what percentage of income is (has been or would be) deducted monthly for 
pension system contributions? [yes/no] 
• Do you know the legal retirement age for women? [60] 
• Do you know the legal retirement age for men? [65] 
• Do you know how to calculate pensions in the AFP? [yes, by balance of individual account 
and other elements such as age of retirement] 
• Do you know there is a minimum state guaranteed old age pension for people aged 65 and 
over? [yes/no] 
• Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system introduced in 2002? [yes/no] 
 
Table 3 lists all 12 financial literacy questions along with a summary of how the 
individuals in our sample answered them. As is clear from Column 1, only half of the 
respondents knew the correct answer to the core questions (1-3), and fewer knew the 
sophisticated financial literacy questions (4-6). While people did score relatively well on the risk 
diversification question, they could have been guessing as only a true/false response was 
required.14
                                                 
14 This pattern is similar to that reported for India and higher than for Indonesia (Cole, Sampson, and Zia 2009). 
 Patterns are more variable for questions regarding knowledge of pension system 
benefit rules and provisions: most knew the legal retirement ages, but only about one-third knew 
the mandatory contribution rates and only 10 percent could say how benefits are computed.  
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About half the sample knew about both the guaranteed minimum benefit and the Voluntary 
Savings plan.  
Table 3 here 
Previous authors have measured financial literacy by selecting one or two key questions 
and reporting whether respondents answered each one correctly (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a). 
With such a rich set of financial literacy measures available in the EPS, however, it is inefficient 
to limit ourselves to a question or two; instead, we seek to use all the information contained in 
the dozen questions. A conventional way to aggregate responses would be to assign one point to 
each question answered correctly and calculate an overall percentage correct score. Yet this 
approach has the disadvantage of weighting each question equally and hence does not allow 
distinctions among questions either in difficulty or information.   
A more sophisticated approach to measuring financial literacy employs a weighted 
scoring mechanism called PRIDIT, first designed to deal with difficult-to-observe outcomes 
where indicator variables that proxy for the dependent variable are binary or categorical. For 
example, Brockett et al. (2002) use the approach to assess insurance fraud, where investigators 
use several indicator variables (such as whether an individual had time gaps between medical 
treatments or experienced many hospital visits) to assess whether a given claim might be 
fraudulent. PRIDIT has also been used in the health economics field to evaluate hospital care, 
where indicators of quality are used to generate a ‘best’ or most informative quality index 
(Lieberthal, 2008).  
In what follows, we use the PRIDIT approach to develop financial literacy scores and 
highlight which questions are the most informative indicators of financial literacy.15
                                                 
15 A related approach was implemented in Mitchell et al. (2008) in an analysis of pension switching patterns. 
 This 
approach involves a two-step weighting scheme, where the first step links each individual’s 
responses on particular questions to others’ responses to the same question. One goal is to 
determine which questions are more difficult – ones that few people answer correctly – and then 
it gives more credit to particularly difficult questions that few people can answer correctly. A 
simple aggregation would simply assign zero credit for an incorrect answer and a full point for 
each correct answer; by contrast, PRIDIT applies a negative penalty for an incorrect answer and 
a greater penalty for a question that more of the population answers correctly. As an example, a 
small fraction of the sample answered question 4 correctly (Table 3, Column 1), so question 4 is 
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considered a difficult question. Consequently, answering question 4 correctly is assigned a 
greater reward, while answering it incorrectly results in only a relatively small penalty. Unlike 
simple integer scoring, this method captures the degree and direction to which an individual’s 
response stands out relative to the population.   
The second PRIDIT step applies a principal components analysis to take into account 
correlations across questions.16
The last column of Table 3 reports PRIDIT weights for each question that are indicative 
of how “informative” a given question is regarding the underlying latent financial literacy 
  The resulting PRIDIT scores indicate how financially literate an 
individual is in relation to the average population and to specific questions asked. Questions tend 
to be informative, ceteris paribus, the less they are correlated with other questions. The bivariate 
correlations are suggestive though not conclusive in this regard, because correlations of the 
answers to a question with a linear combination of the answers to other questions may differ 
from the bivariate correlations. The bivariate correlations among the correct answers to the 
questions vary considerably, from 0.04 (for the correlations between question 4 and questions 8, 
9, and 11) to 0.63 (for the correlation between questions 8 and 9).  Also the mean correlations of 
each question with the other 11 questions vary considerably, with those for questions 4 and 10 
only about half of those for questions 1, 2 and 12 (third column from right in Table 3).  By this 
criterion, in isolation, questions 4 and 10 seem to be relatively important.  But this is not the only 
criterion.  Questions also tend to be more important on average, ceteris paribus, if the 
proportions correct are closer to one half, rather than almost zero or almost one.  The intuition 
for this is clear by considering the extremes: questions for which the proportion correct is zero or 
one provide no information because the answers are the same for everyone, whereas questions 
for which the proportion correct is close to zero or close to one provide substantial information to 
distinguish among those in the tails of the distribution. However, if the distribution of the 
underlying latent variable for true financial literacy is normal, relatively few individuals will  be 
in the tails of the distribution, versus in the middle.  By this criterion, questions 4 and 10 are 
relatively unimportant, particularly in comparison to the three ‘core’ HRS questions (1-3) and 
questions 6, 11 and 12 (penultimate column in Table 3).  
                                                 
16 Specifically, we calculate the first principal component vector for each of the 12 questions and the eigenvalue of 
the first principal component. The eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue captures more of the variance in the data 
than any other eigenvector. Using these values, we then calculate a weight for each question that gives more weight 
to questions that are more informative on financial literacy. 
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variable, relative to other questions based on both criteria. The ‘core’ HRS financial literacy 
questions receive the greatest weight compared to the other financial literacy questions included 
in the EPS.  Next most informative are the queries on pension system knowledge (e.g. question 7 
“Do you know what percentage of income is deducted for monthly pension system 
contributions?” and  question 12 “Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system 
introduced in 2002?”).   Despite being most informative by the criterion of being least correlated 
with other questions, question 4 “Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the 
interest rate that you earn on these savings is 10 percent a year. How much would you have in 
the account after 2 years?” and question 10 “Do you know how to calculate pensions in the 
AFP?”) have the smallest PRIDIT weights because of the second criteria discussed in the 
previous paragraph (i.e., proportions correct close to zero).  
The PRIDIT score thus computed is highly correlated with a simple percentage correct 
tally, and results using either type of aggregation are very similar. Nevertheless, we favor the 
PRIDIT approach as it incorporates additional information about the relative difficulty of each 
question and value-added of each question, and we use it in estimates presented below.   
Control Variables. Demographic controls included in our specification for equation (1) include 
Age in a quadratic form to account for the typical hump-shaped life-cycle pattern of wealth 
accumulation.   The mean age of our respondents is 43 years, with a standard deviation of 11 
years. We also control on the variable Male, a dichotomous variable to allow for shifts on 
average between wealth accumulations for men versus women.  Just over half (52 percent) of our 
respondents are male.  
 We do not include in the set of controls any variables likely to be determined in part by 
schooling and financial literacy, and hence possibly affect wealth, such as marital status and 
current residence.17
                                                 
17 We adopt this approach because we are interested in the gross effect of schooling and financial literacy, not net of 
effects through such behaviors as marital status and current residence. Moreover, if we were to include such 
variables it would be necessary to treat them as endogenous, but it is difficult to increase the number of endogenous 
variables beyond the two on which we focus. For this reason, our approach thus assumes that these are among the 
channels through which schooling and financial literacy work to affect wealth.  (Below we explore the robustness of 
our estimates to the inclusion of such factors in the second-stage estimates, but without treating them as 
behaviorally-determined.)   
  We do include as controls some of the candidate instruments that do not 
satisfy the second condition for a good instrument, independence of the disturbance term in 
equation (1), which are apparently correlated with factors that have direct effects on wealth 
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accumulation in addition to any effects that work through schooling and financial literacy. We 
indicate which variables these are in our discussion of the results below. 
Candidate First-Stage Instruments: As is generally the case, we cannot identify good instruments 
a priori, only possible candidate instruments that might predict schooling and financial literacy 
well, while not being correlated with the second-stage disturbance. Even experiments that 
directly affect schooling and financial literacy might not be good instruments if they have weak 
effects on schooling and financial literacy (and therefore do not satisfy the first condition), or if 
they affect wealth directly through some other channel than schooling and financial literacy (and 
therefore do not satisfy the second condition).  In what follows, we consider as three broad sets 
of candidate instruments:  Age-dependent variables, Family Background factors, and Respondent 
Personality traits. We describe each in turn. 
  For the Age-dependent variables, we include factors indicative of where the respondents 
attended primary school as children, how old they were when an innovative national voucher 
program was implemented by the government in 1981, what macroeconomic conditions were 
when they were of an age to have been making marginal schooling and  labor market entry 
decisions, and what pension marketing practices prevailed when they were of an age to have 
completed initial job searches and to have settled in more permanent positions. These four 
variables are as follows: 
− Primary School in Urban Area:  In Chile, as in many countries, urban primary schools on 
average tend to be better and have a wider range of options, which may lead to more 
learning relevant for financial literacy and greater schooling attainment.  Chile is a fairly 
urban country and 81 percent of the respondents did attend primary school in urban areas. 
− School Voucher Exposure (years of school age under voucher system):  In 1981, the 
Chilean government adopted a national school voucher system for primary and secondary 
school.  Anyone turning age 18 prior to 1981 therefore had no exposure, whereas younger 
individuals had varying numbers of years of exposure to the new school voucher 
program. We posit that this exogenous policy change may have had significant effects on 
individual schooling attainment and financial literacy. At the same time, the introduction 
of school vouchers could also have had direct effects on wealth accumulation through 
increasing schooling quality, beyond direct effects on financial literacy and schooling 
attainment.  For instance, Bravo, Mukhopadhyay, and Todd (2010) report that this 
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schooling reform improved schooling quality and resulted in subsequent higher labor 
market earnings for adults exposed to the voucher system when they were children.  Our 
respondents averaged 2.2 years of exposure to the voucher system when they were of 
primary school age and 1.8 years of exposure to the voucher system when they were of 
secondary school age, but with a fair amount of variance among respondents depending 
on when they were born.  In fact, a substantial majority of our respondents (73 percent) 
had no exposure to the school voucher system at all due to having been older than age 18 
at the time of the reform.  
− Macroeconomic conditions around the time of the school-leaving/labor-market-entry 
decision: It is also likely that the state of the macroeconomy around the age respondents 
made school-leaving and labor market entry decisions influenced both their schooling 
attainment and financial literacy.  For this reason we control for the unemployment rate in 
the Santiago metropolitan area at the time the individual was age 16, since these rates 
(but not national rates) are available for a sufficiently long time period and a large 
fraction of the population lives in the capital city.  
− Pension marketing activities around end of early adult job search:  We also posit that 
AFP marketing agents and expenditures early in a respondent’s work life could increase 
financial literacy, by enhancing awareness of wealth accumulation in general and of 
pensions in particular.  Accordingly, we measure the number of marketing agents and 
AFP marking expenditures around the time the individual completed initial labor market 
search and settled down in more permanent employment, around age 24. But such AFP 
marketing activities might also have direct effects on wealth accumulation in addition to 
indirect effects through financial literacy (or possibly schooling, though most respondents 
completed their schooling prior to age 24), a pathway we test below.  In fact, there was 
substantial variation in the number of AFP marketing agents and marketing expenditures 
across respondent birth cohorts; at the same time, almost 40 percent of respondents were 
older than 24 before the AFP system was implemented, so for them marketing activities 
around this age were zero. 
We posit that these four conditions are unlikely to have been affected by conscious decisions by 
either the respondents when they were young, or their families, to increase respondents' 
subsequent wealth levels.  That is, we assume that respondents’ parents did not move to urban 
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areas when the children were in primary school for reasons correlated with the respondents' later 
wealth accumulations, and that neither the respondents nor their parents could affect national 
schooling voucher policies, macroeconomic conditions, or AFP marketing.  Nevertheless, some 
of these variables might not satisfy the second condition for good instruments, as we note above 
and test in the empirical work. 
  For the Family Background Variables, it is well-known that there are strong empirical 
links between family background and schooling attainment, and family background is included 
among instruments in some previous studies where schooling attainment is a right-side 
explanatory variable.18  We argue that a similar association exists with financial literacy (though 
there is no literature to date on the topic), and accordingly family background should meet the 
first condition for a good financial literacy instrument as well. Nevertheless, it seems a priori 
plausible that family background could also proxy for factors such as intergenerationally 
correlated ability endowments via channels other than schooling and financial literacy that 
directly affect wealth.19
− Paternal and Material Schooling Attainment: These averaged 7.2 and 6.6 grades, 
respectively, indicating considerable intergenerational increases in schooling attainment 
given the respondents’ average of 10.4 grades of schooling completed.  
 Accordingly, we include indicators of family background in our set of 
candidate instruments, but we test whether they satisfy the second condition for being good 
instruments.  The specific family background indicators we include are: 
− Poor Economic Background when Child: Some eight percent of respondents 
characterized their childhood family economic background as poor. 
− Respondent Worked when Under 15 Years of Age:  Child labor generally is associated 
with poorer family backgrounds; in our sample; 7 percent of respondents reported that 
they had started to work when younger than 15 years of age. 
Respondent Personality Traits are enduring individual characteristics that generally 
reflect genetic endowments and earlier life experience rather than states that change over fairly 
short time periods for adults. McCrae and Costa (1990), for example, report that both many 
longitudinal studies following the same individuals over time and cross-sectional comparisons 
                                                 
18 See Hanushek and Welch (2006), as well as studies mentioned in the next note and the citations therein. 
19 For example, studies of the impact of maternal schooling on child schooling find that significantly positive 
associations become much smaller or even reversed in sign if estimation techniques using twins data, adopted 
children, or policy changes are used to control for unobserved intergenerationally-correlated endowments such as 
ability (e.g., Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002, 2005; Black, Devereux, and Salvanes 2005; Plug, 2004). 
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across different age groups show a high degree of stability in personality traits during 
adulthood.20 Heritability variance decompositions using twins data typically attribute half (and 
sometimes much more) of the overall variance of personality traits to genetic variation, and the 
remaining variance is mostly due to early life experience. 21
− Risk Aversion, referring to a respondent’s reluctance to accept a risky but possible more 
rewarding alternative versus a choice with a more certain but lower 
 For this reason, we posit that some 
personality traits observed in our data are relatively stable and may have significant effects on 
schooling and financial literacy. Of course they may also have direct effects on wealth 
accumulation in addition to indirect effects through schooling and financial literacy, and thus 
they could violate the second condition for good instruments, something that we also test below.  
The specific variables we use from the EPS are as follows: 
expected payoff.  
This is measured using a dichotomous variable for a positive answer for Alternative A to 
the following question:22
Suppose that you, as the only source of household income, have to choose between 
the following two jobs. What alternative would you choose in [this] situation? 
 
Alternative A. A fixed income job that is stable for life. 
Alternative B. A job where you have the same possibility of earning double or only 
three quarters of your income for the rest of your life. 
By this measure almost two-thirds (65 percent) of our sample is risk averse.23
− Self Esteem is used by psychologists to refer to an individual’s overall evaluation of his 
or her own worth (Mruk 2006).  For empirical research, this is usually assessed with a 
 
                                                 
20 For some other examples see Kahnemann (1999:14) who argues that, with respect to wellbeing or happiness, 
“each individual may be on a personal treadmill that tends to restore well-being to a predetermined setpoint after 
each change of circumstances.” Csikszentmihalyi and Jeremy (2003: 185–186) conclude that “chance events like 
personal tragedies, illness, or sudden strokes of good fortune may drastically affect the level of happiness, but 
apparently these effects do not last long.” And Costa et al. (1987: 54) report that “objective circumstances appear to 
be limited in the magnitude, scope, and particularly duration of their effects on psychological well-being, which, in 
the long run, is likely to reflect instead stable characteristics of the individual.” Easterlin (2005) reviews the 
psychological literature with respect to this “set-point theory” of happiness. 
21Lykken and Tellegen (1996) report that variation in the well-being component of the Multidimensional Personality 
Questionnaire for twins in the Minnesota Twin Registry is primarily associated with genetic variation; that is, 
genetic effects account for up to 80 percent of the variance in happiness indicators obtained by averaging repeated 
measures of well-being. Moreover, socioeconomic status, schooling, family income, marital status, and religious 
commitment do not account for more than three percent of the variance in these averaged measures of well-being.  
In another example, Bouchard and McGue (2003) summarize the estimated heritabilities for the “Big Five” 
personality traits to be about one-half.  
22 This is third question in a series of three alternative pairs, where the previous two indicate riskier options for 
Alternative B.   
23 For other recent studies linking risk aversion and economic behavior, see Dohmen et al. (2010 a, b), Eckell et al. 
(2005); and Guiso et al. (2005, 2008).   Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman and ter Weel (2008) provide another recent 
discussion about personality traits and economics. 
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self-report inventory such as the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale that usually uses a 10-
question battery scored on a four-point response system that requires participants to 
indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements about themselves.   The 2006 
EPS applied a version of the Rosenberg test as follows: 
Finally, we ask about the level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
statements: [Scale: 1. Strongly Disagree, 2. Disagree, 3. Agree, 4. Strongly 
Agree] 
1. I feel that I am a valuable person, at least with respect to others 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities 
3. I definitely tend to think that I am a failure 
4. I can do things as well as other people 
5. I do not feel that I have much to be proud of 
6. I have a positive attitude about myself 
7. All in all, I am happy with myself 
8. I would like to have more self-respect 
9. I sometimes feel useless 
10. I sometimes feel that I am good for nothing. 
 
 In our analysis, we focus on a measure of positive self-esteem defined as the sum of the 
answers to questions 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, as well as a measure of negative self-esteem defined as the 
sum of the answers to questions 3, 5, 8, 9 and 10.24
Finally we also include a vector of other respondent characteristics for robustness tests 
in some alternative specifications. We do not include these in our basic estimates because many 
could argue they are endogenous, including residence in the Santiago metropolitan area at the 
time of the survey (38 percent), self-reported bad (6 percent) or good health (69 percent), being 
never married (23 percent) or married at the time of the survey (66 percent), being a household 
head (56 percent) or spouse of household head (24 percent) at the survey date.     
  Both sums range from 1 to 20, with a mean 
for positive self-esteem of 16.1 and for negative self-esteem of 10.5.  Each of the five respective 
components in each sum is weighted equally, so we also investigate whether any of the 
components has significantly different effects than the sums.  
 
Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
  Since most prior studies have used ordinary least squares (OLS) models that did not treat 
schooling and financial literacy as behaviorally determined or imprecisely measured due to 
                                                 
24 We also considered a combined index defined as positive self-esteem – negative self-esteem, but the two separate 
indices have greater predictive power so we include them separately in our estimates.  
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random measurement errors, we also begin with OLS estimates to describe the associations 
among schooling, financial literacy, and the wealth, pension density and retirement planning 
outcomes. Results appear in Table 4 (control variables are identical to those used later in IV 
models so estimates can be compared across results). 
Table 4 here 
 Panel I of Table 4 reports estimated coefficients for a specification that includes only the 
PRIDIT index of financial literacy and excludes schooling (equation 1a-subvariant 1). Results 
indicate that the PRIDIT index is positive and strongly statistically significant in all four wealth 
equations, the density of pension contributions, and the probability of calculating the money 
needed for retirement. Moreover, the estimates are quantitatively important, implying that a 0.2 
standard deviation increase in the PRIDIT index (taken from Table 2) is associated with an 
average $4,000 increase in net wealth, or almost 6 percent increase in mean net wealth.  The 
largest response is for pension wealth ($2,200), with other wealth ($1,000) and housing wealth 
($800) less than half as large.  A 0.2 standard deviation increase in PRIDIT is also associated 
with an average increase of 1.4 percent in the density of pension contributions and 0.8 percent 
increase in the probability of calculating the money needed for retirement. 
  Panel II of Table 4 provides coefficient estimates for an OLS specification that includes 
schooling as an explanatory variable but excludes the PRIDIT financial literacy measure 
(equation 1a-subvariant 2).  Schooling coefficient estimates are positive and highly significant 
for all four wealth measures, the density of pension contributions, and retirement planning. 
Moreover they are substantial and even somewhat larger than the PRIDIT effects in that they 
imply that that a 0.2 standard deviation increase in schooling (taken from Table 2) is associated 
with an average $5,900 increase in net wealth, or 8.3 percent of mean net wealth.  The largest 
component of this overall wealth increment again is pension wealth ($3,000), with other wealth 
($1,600) and housing wealth ($1,300) taken together almost as large.  A 0.2 standard deviation 
increase in schooling is associated with an average increase of 1.4 percent in the density of 
pension contributions and 0.6 percent increase in the probability of calculating money needed for 
retirement. 
  Yet the PRIDIT financial literacy index and schooling are significantly positively 
correlated (r=0.51), so their coefficients estimates are anticipated to change when both are 
included in the same regression. Indeed this is the case, as is shown in Panel III of Table 4 
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(equation 1a), where the PRIDIT coefficient estimates drop by a quarter for the density of 
pension contributions to two-thirds for housing wealth, with total wealth in between, dropping by 
half.  The schooling coefficient estimates also decline, though by less, around 10 percent for 
housing wealth and 16 percent for total wealth.  Consequently, one can conclude that including 
only one of these two explanatory variables in OLS regressions produces larger estimates for 
each, than if both are included. Nevertheless, when both are included, the associations remain 
significant and fairly large in magnitude for both. 
  As noted in the discussion of equation (1), having only linear terms for schooling and 
financial literacy is but one possible specification choice. Adding interactions between schooling 
and the PRIDIT financial literacy index in addition to the linear terms alters the results somewhat 
(Panel IV of Table 4, equation 1b). The linear schooling coefficient estimates remain about the 
same magnitudes as without the interaction term, and they are estimated with greater precision. 
Yet the linear PRIDIT coefficient estimates become negative and significant for three of the four 
wealth outcomes (of course, the total association of PRIDIT with the wealth outcomes for any 
schooling attainment must include the interaction with schooling attainment).  For the density of 
pension contributions, in contrast, the coefficient estimates of both the PRIDIT and the schooling 
terms remain significantly positive and the coefficient estimates of the interaction is significantly 
negative.   For the retirement planning variable, the coefficient estimates on both the PRIDIT and 
the schooling terms also remain significantly positive but the coefficient estimate of the 
interaction is insignificant. 
  If the specification of the effects of financial literacy and schooling is limited to only the 
PRIDIT-schooling interaction term (Panel V in Table 4, equation 1c), the coefficient estimates of 
the interaction are positive, significant, and fairly substantial for all of the wealth outcomes and 
for the density of pension contributions and retirement planning. 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimates 
  As noted above, omitted variables and/or measurement error can bias measured OLS 
coefficients, so next we turn to instrumental variable (IV) estimates using the candidate 
instruments discussed above.  Some of the candidate instruments – namely, years of exposure to 
school vouchers when of school age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk 
aversion – do not appear to be independent of the second-stage disturbance term but do seem to 
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affect wealth accumulation and the density of contribution directly, in addition to indirect effects 
through schooling and financial literacy.  This result suggests that the Hansen J statistic has some 
power in identifying problematic candidate instruments, and we include all these variables as 
controls in results to follow (as well as in the OLS estimates discussed above).  Our remaining 
instruments, discussed at the end of this paragraph and listed in Appendix Table B, work quite 
well.  First, they predict both financial literacy and schooling well as is required by the first 
condition for good instruments. For instance, when financial literacy and schooling enter 
linearly, the F tests for excluded instruments respectively are 156.56 and 215.57 (prob > F = 
0.0000 in both cases), the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments 
respectively are 17.19 and 24.58 (prob > F = 0.0000 in both cases), and the Kleibergen-Paap 
Wald F weak identification test statistic is 15.767, indicating between 5 percent and 10 percent 
maximal IV relative bias according to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values. Second, they 
are independent of the second-stage disturbance term as required by the second condition for 
good instruments.  The Hansen J statistic for the overidentification test of all instruments’ p 
values are from 0.26 to 0.92 for the linear specification in equation 1a (see Table 5), indicating 
that our instruments are independent of the disturbance term in the second-stage relation.25 The 
patterns of significant coefficient estimates are also plausible a priori: positive effects are 
recorded for having had primary schooling in an urban area and positive self-esteem, and 
negative effects of unemployment rates when age 16 and negative self-esteem (with some 
significant deviations from equal weighting for some of the components of esteem).26
  When only the PRIDIT financial literacy index is included and instrumented (equation 
1a-subvariant 1), the coefficient estimates are positive, significant, substantial, and twice to three 
times larger than the OLS estimates presented earlier (compare Panel I of Table 5 with Panel I of 
Table 4). When only schooling is included and instrumented (equation 1a-subvariant 2), the 
coefficient estimates are positive, significant, substantial, and from 16-84 percent larger than the 
comparable OLS estimates (Panel II of Table 5 versus Panel II of Table 4).  But when we include 
  
Interestingly, negative self-esteem is a much more important predictor of both financial literacy 
and schooling than is positive self-esteem. 
                                                 
25 The p values also are satisfactory for the specification with only the PRIDIT measure of financial literacy in Panel 
I of Table 5.  For the specification with only schooling in Panel II of Table 5 the p values for four of the outcomes 
are below 0.011.  However if the true relation is equation (1a), this relation is actually mis-specified because 
financial literacy is excluded, which could account for this result.   
26 See Appendix B for a complete set of estimates. 
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both the instrumented schooling and the PRIDIT financial literacy variables (equation 1a), the 
schooling effects mostly become statistically insignificant and negative, whereas the PRIDIT 
effects are positive, significant, substantial and much larger than the OLS results (compare Panel 
III in Tables 4 and 5; the latter effects are 282-1775 percent larger for the PRIDIT variable) for 
all of the dependent variables except retirement planning. The effect of financial literacy on 
retirement planning is no longer statistically significant when we instrument both financial 
literacy and schooling. 
Table 5 here 
  This pattern suggests that, if equation (1a) is the true model, OLS coefficient estimates 
substantially understate the effect of financial literacy on wealth accumulation, due to random 
measurement error and omitted variable bias.  This may be due to omitted factors in the OLS 
framework that are negatively associated with wealth accumulation but positively correlated with 
financial literacy. For example, as noted above, over-cautious individuals who invest more in 
financial literacy may be less successful in accumulating wealth.27
  Since the two sets of the HRS questions have also been introduced recently in other 
international surveys, we assess the marginal impacts of correct responses of the individual 
questions on each of the six outcomes of interest. Table 6 gives simulated impacts for the “core” 
as well as the “sophisticated” HRS questions, based on the linear specification of 0.2 standard 
deviation increases in correct responses to individual questions underlying the PRIDIT estimates.  
The findings suggest that knowing the correct answers to the HRS ”core” questions has a 
  If the IV estimates can be 
interpreted causally, as we argue is appropriate, these estimates mean that financial literacy is a 
powerful determinant of wealth and pension contributions.  Specifically, they imply that a 0.2 
standard deviation increase in the PRIDIT financial literacy score could, on average, raise net 
wealth by $13,800, broken down into about a $5,200 boost in pension wealth, a $1,600 rise in net 
housing wealth, and a gain of $6,900 in other wealth. The same 0.2 standard deviation increase 
in the PRIDIT financial literacy score would also boost the density of pension contributions by 
on average of 3 percent and the probability of calculating retirement money by an average of .5 
percent. In other words, increased financial literacy can have relatively large payoffs in wealth, 
particularly pension and other wealth, and less so in terms of housing wealth.  
                                                 
27 Another example of such positive selection is offered by Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) who show that long-
term health care insurance buyers tend to be healthier, which they interpret to indicate that cautious people buy 
insurance and take good care of their health.  
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particularly strong impact. It is also of interest that schooling has only a small and insignificant 
impact when both factors are instrumented.  In other words, if the true model is equation (1a) for 
these outcomes, mis-specifying the relation by leaving out financial literacy (as Table 5, Panel II) 
leads to rather misleading estimates of the impact of schooling on household wealth 
accumulations.28  Our preferred linear estimates (Table 5, Panel III) for these outcomes suggest 
that it is financial literacy that actually counts, rather than increasing general schooling 
attainment.29
Table 6 here 
    
  Adding a PRIDIT-schooling interaction term in Panel IV of Table 5 (equation 1b) results 
in coefficient estimates for the interaction terms that are positive for all wealth components 
(though not for the density of pension contributions or retirement planning) and substantially 
more precisely estimated than the linear PRIDIT and schooling terms for three of the four wealth 
components. Indeed the interactions are the only variables that have significantly nonzero 
coefficient estimates for the wealth components at even the 0.10 level (and for total wealth at the 
0.05 level), which suggests a specification that includes only the interaction between PRIDIT 
and schooling (as in Panel V of Table 5, equation 1c).  The diagnostics for such estimates are 
good: the F test for excluded instruments30 is 109.74 (prob > F = 0.0000) and the Kleibergen-
Paap rk Wald F weak identification test statistic is 109.74, indicating substantially less than 5 
percent maximal IV relative bias according to the Stock-Yogo weak IV test critical values.  With 
regard to the second condition for good instruments, the Hansen J statistic for the 
overidentification test of all instruments p values are from 0.39 to 0.95 for the wealth 
components (last row of Table 5), suggesting that our instruments are independent of the 
disturbance term in the second-stage relation.31
                                                 
28As well as problems with the Hansen’s J-test for overidentifying restrictions that suggests that the second 
condition for good instruments is not satisfied, as noted above.  
   The root mean squared errors are somewhat 
smaller for the interactive specification in Panel V (equation 1c) than for the linear specifications 
for other wealth and total wealth (Panel III, equation 1b), but slightly larger for pension wealth, 
29 For other wealth, the schooling coefficient estimate is significant and fairly large but negative (which carries over 
at the 10% significance level for total wealth); this result is surprising and may be implausible.  We conjecture that 
this negative schooling coefficient estimate may reflect some interaction with financial literacy that also probably 
underlies the relatively large coefficient estimate for financial literacy for this outcome.   
30 In the one endogenous variable case, this also is the Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments. 
31 For the density of contributions this test also is satisfactory with a probability of 0.21.  For the financial planning 
indicator, however, it is less so with a probability of 0.06.  
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household wealth, the density of pension contributions, and retirement planning.   
  These findings indicate that a case can be made to favor the interactive over the linear 
specification for other wealth and total wealth, though the estimated effects for the interactive 
specification are, in any case, substantial for the wealth components and similar to those for the 
linear model in Panel III of Table 5 discussed above.  They imply that a 0.2 standard deviation 
increase PRIDIT in the interactive format would induce a $11,600 increase in total net wealth, 
attributable to a $5,900 increase in pension wealth, a $3,600 increase in other wealth, and a 
$2,100 increase in housing wealth.  These are somewhat bigger than the implied effects the same 
PRIDIT change in the linear model for pension wealth (13 percent bigger) and housing wealth 
(by 28 percent), but substantially smaller for other wealth (48 percent smaller) and somewhat 
smaller for total wealth (by 16 percent).32
 Finally, we assess how robust our estimates are to specification changes (results available on 
request). For example, given intergenerational correlations in schooling (significant correlations 
of 0.34 with fathers, 0.38 with mothers), including parental schooling as a control in the second-
stage could change estimated impacts of respondent schooling attainment.  Interestingly, we find 
no substantial changes in our variables of interest.  Similarly, it might be thought that including 
the family background variables as second-stage controls could make a difference, but again 
there are no substantial changes in results.  Finally, we allow for the possibility that respondent 
characteristics at the time of the survey, such as current urban residence, current health, marital 
status, household head/spouse, could enter the second stage; again the relevant coefficient 
estimates are robust.    
    
 
Discussion and Implications  
 In this paper we use an instrumental variable approach to identify the impact of financial 
literacy and schooling on wealth accumulation and pension contribution patterns.  Prior studies 
have linked financial literacy and schooling with positive financial outcomes, but they usually do 
not control for unobserved factors that might shape both financial literacy and schooling, as well 
as wealth outcomes, nor do they control for possible measurement error in financial literacy and 
schooling. Using an IV approach (and conditional on our specification assumptions), we have 
                                                 
32 The interactive estimates seem more plausible for other wealth and possibly total net wealth, because the 
relatively large positive coefficient estimate for financial literacy in the linear case (Table 5, Panel III) may 
compensate for the substantial significantly negative coefficient estimate for schooling.  
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isolated the causal effects of financial literacy and schooling on wealth outcomes using plausibly 
exogenous variation of instruments available in the Chilean Social Protection Survey. Results for 
a nationally-representative sample of adults indicate that financial literacy and schooling 
attainment are both positively and significantly correlated with wealth, pension contributions, 
and retirement planning using OLS, while the IV estimates uncover an even stronger positive 
impact of financial literacy. They also indicate no significant positive effects of schooling 
attainment, conditional on financial literacy, in a linear specification, though the effect is positive 
when interacted with financial literacy.  
 There are several implications of our findings. First, prior studies using OLS models to 
estimate the effects of financial literacy and schooling are likely to be misleading due to 
measurement error and unobserved factors. IV estimates indicate that financial literacy is at least 
as important, if not more so, than schooling, in explaining variation in household wealth and 
pension contributions. Second, our improved estimates of the impact of financial literacy are 
economically meaningful and potentially quite important. Indeed, in our view they are 
substantial enough to imply that investments in financial literacy could well have high payoffs. 
Third, our estimates indicate that some components of financial literacy, such as the HRS ”core” 
questions, are particularly important. This insight would not have been gained with the most 
representations of financial literacy (e.g., percentage correct) used in the previous literature, 
Fourth, our paper contributes to a growing body of research on the factors influencing peoples’ 
attachment to financial markets.  Households that build up more net wealth, particularly via the 
pension system, may be better able to smooth consumption in retirement and thus enhance risk-
sharing and wellbeing in old age. Our finding that financial literacy enhances peoples’ likelihood 
of contributing to their pension saving suggests that this is a valuable pathway by which 
improved financial literacy can build household net wealth. 
In future work we hope to evaluate in more detail the costs as well as the benefits of 
enhancing financial literacy levels. Nevertheless, we view as very important the central finding 
of this paper that individuals, firms, and governments can enhance household wealth and 
wellbeing by investing in financial literacy.   
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables. 
 
    Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Wealth components (2006 US$ 1000s) 
     Pension Wealth  38.6 87.3 0 1076.8 
 
Housing Wealth  22.1 43.7 -223 1395.8 
 
Other Wealth 10.9 123 -553.8 11572 
 
Total Wealth 71.5 166.1 -519.7 11985 
Pension Density (%) 47.7 34.8 0 100 
Calculated Retirement Money (%) 7.9 26.9 0 100 
 
Note:  Calculated from Chilean 2006 Social Protection Survey (EPS) on a sample of 13,054 respondents age 24-
retirement age (60 for women, 65 for men) for whom key variables (including wealth outcomes, financial literacy, 
schooling) are available. See text. 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Right-Side Variables and Candidate Instruments. 
       Mean St. Dev. Min. Max. 
Key Right-Side Variables     
  Financial Literacy PRIDIT Score 0.6 7.7 -15.3 23.3 
  Schooling Attainment (Grades) 10.4 3.9 0 20 
  PRIDIT*Schooling Attainment 15 84.3 -259.5 466.4 
Right-Side Demographic Controls     
  Age (Years) 42.7 10.6 24 65 
  Male (%) 51.9 50 0 100 
Candidate First-Stage Instruments     
 I. Age-Related Variables     
  Primary School Urban (%) 80.9 39.3 0 100 
  School Vouchers     
   Primary Ages 2.2 3.2 0 8 
   Secondary Ages 1.8 1.9 0 4 
   Total 4 4.9 0 12 
  AFP Activities at Age 24     
   Number of Agents (10^3) 6.2 6.9 0 23.7 
   Marketing Expenditures (P10^9) 2.2 2.7 0 10.1 
   No AFP Activities (%) 39.2 48.8 0 100 
  Macroeconomy at Age 16     
   Unemployment Rate (%) 10.3 5.2 3 23.2 
 II. Family Background     
  Father Schooling Attainment (Grades) 7.2 3.5 0 20 
  Mother Schooling Attainment (Grades) 6.6 3.4 0 20 
  Poor Economic Background (%) 8 27.1 0 100 
  Respondent Worked < 15 Y of Age (%) 6.9 25.4 0 100 
 III. Personality Traits     
  Risk Aversion (%) 64.5 47.9 0 100 
  Positive Self Esteem (Sum) 16.1 2.5 5 20 
   Valuable Person 3.2 0.7 1 4 
   Number of Good Qualities 3.2 0.6 1 4 
   Can Do Well As Others 3.3 0.7 1 4 
   Positive Attitude about Self 3.2 0.7 1 4 
   Happy with Self 3.2 0.7 1 4 
  Negative Self Esteem (Sum) 10.5 2.6 5 20 
   Think I am a Failure 1.8 0.7 1 4 
   Not Much to be Proud of 2.1 0.9 1 4 
   Like More Self Respect 2.6 0.8 1 4 
   Sometimes Feel Useless 2.2 0.8 1 4 
   Feel Good for Nothing 1.9 0.8 1 4 
Selected Current Characteristics     
  Santiago Metropolitan Residence (%) 38.4 48.6 0 100 
  Health Bad (%) 6.4 24.5 0 100 
  Health Good (%) 68.7 46.4 0 100 
  Never Married (%) 22.8 41.9 0 100 
  Now Married (%) 65.7 47.5 0 100 
  Household Head (%) 55.5 49.7 0 100 
  Spouse of Household Head (%) 24.3 42.9 0 100 
Note: For sample see Table 1.
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Table 3. Financial Literacy Questions: Percent Correct and PRIDIT Weighting Scheme   
  Question Correct (%) PRIDIT weights 
Concepts of basic economics and finance   Main HRS questions:   
(1) If the chance of catching an illness is 10%, how many people out of 1000 would get the illness? 50% 0.64 
(2) If 5 people share winning lottery tickets and the total prize is 2 Million pesos, how much would each receive? 44% 0.59 
(3) 
Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate you earn on this money is 
2% a year. If you keep this money in the account for 5 years, how much would you have after 5 
years? [over $120, exactly $120, less than $120] 
50% 0.59 
Additional questions:   
(4) Assume that you have $200 in a savings account, and the interest rate that you earn on these savings is 10% a year. How much would you have in the account after 2 years? [exact number] 2% 0.29 
(5) 
Assume that you have $100 in a savings account and the interest rate that you earn on these 
savings is 1% a year. Inflation is 2% a year. After one year, if you withdraw the money from 
the savings account you could buy more/less/the same? 
26% 0.42 
(6) T/F: Buying shares in one company is less risky than buying shares from many different companies with the same money. 46% 0.44 
Knowledge of benefit rules and institutions   
(7) Do you knows what percentage of income is (has been or would be) deducted monthly for pension system contributions? [yes/no] 37% 0.54 
(8) Do you know the legal retirement age for women? [60] 79% 0.44 
(9) Do you know the legal retirement age for men? [65] 84% 0.41 
(10) Do you know how to calculate pensions in the AFP? [yes, by balance of individual account and other elements such as age of retirement] 10% 0.37 
(11) Do you know there is a minimum state guaranteed old age pension for people aged 65 and over? [yes/no] 53% 0.42 
(12) Have you heard of the Voluntary Pension Savings system introduced in 2002? [yes/no] 55% 0.58 
Note: For sample see Table 1. The PRIDIT financial literacy score is calculated using the 12 financial literacy questions in the 2006 EPS. Column 1 lists the % of 
people that answered the question correctly; Column 2 provides PRIDIT weights for each question (see text).   
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Table 4.  OLS Models of Wealth and Pension Density: PRIDIT Alone, Schooling Alone, and 
Both, Plus Interactions  
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT 
Index Alone PRIDIT 1.46 0.49 0.62 2.57 0.91 0.51 
 
t 12.48 8.43 5.82 14.24 25.24 14.72 
II. Schooling 
Alone Schooling 3.89 1.7 2.01 7.59 1.76 0.80 
  t 14.52 12.92 5.78 15.59 21.89 9.93 
III. Both 
PRIDIT and 
Schooling   
      
 
PRIDIT 0.81 0.17 0.25 1.23 0.69 0.44 
 
t 6.61 2.82 2.58 6.91 16.98 11.37 
 
Schooling 3.07 1.53 1.75 6.35 1.06 0.36 
  t 10.75 11.13 4.87 12.46 11.78 4.07 
IV. Linear and 
Interaction 
Effects PRIDIT -0.32 -0.87 -1.17 -2.36 1.5 0.29 
 
t -1.02 -4.9 -2.74 -3.92 14.95 3.01 
 
Schooling 3.14 1.59 1.84 6.56 1.01 0.37 
 
t 10.75 11.62 4.83 12.4 11.22 4.09 
 
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.01 
 
t 3.56 5.54 3.3 5.83 -8.89 1.56 
V. Interaction 
Effect Alone PRIDIT*Schooling 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.04 
  t 11.13 8.69 5.18 12.48 19.77 12.99 
 
Notes:  For sample size see Table 1. A complete set of coefficient estimates is provided in Appendix A. 
Pension density is included in the estimates as proportion between 0 and 1 but the coefficient estimate is 
multiplied by 100 in this table to be of the same magnitude as the other coefficient estimates. Other 
control variables include age, age squared, male, years of exposure to school vouchers when of school 
age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk aversion. “t” refers to t-statistic.  
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Table 5. IV Models of Wealth and Pension Density: PRIDIT Alone, Schooling Alone, and 
Both, Plus Interactions 
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT 
Index Alone PRIDIT 3.23 1.14 1.83 6.2 1.88 0.62 
 
z 9.18 7.46 4.47 10.31 15.15 5.58 
 
Hansen J p 0.35 0.40 0.09 0.14 0.96 0.29 
II. 
Schooling 
Alone Schooling 5.55 1.98 2.66 10.18 3.23 1.12 
 
z 9.12 7.28 4.01 10.23 14.22 5.68 
  Hansen J p 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 
III. Both 
PRIDIT and 
Schooling   
      
 
PRIDIT 3.4 1.06 4.46 8.93 1.94 0.31 
 
z 3.23 1.9 3.64 4.77 4.92 0.90 
 
Schooling -0.34 0.14 -5.05 -5.25 -0.12 0.58 
 
z -0.18 0.14 -2.6 -1.68 -0.17 0.95 
  Hansen J p 0.26 0.30 0.82 0.34 0.92 0.26 
IV. Linear 
and 
Interaction 
Effects 
         PRIDIT -2.28 -1.51 0.28 -3.51 2.15 2.19 
 
z -0.67 -1.01 0.09 -0.65 1.83 1.97 
 
Schooling 2.44 1.4 -3.01 0.82 -0.23 -0.34 
 
z 0.99 1.24 -1.22 0.21 -0.25 -0.41 
 
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.44 0.2 0.33 0.97 -0.02 -0.15 
 
z 1.75 1.7 1.26 2.36 -0.19 -1.80 
Hansen J p 0.41 0.39 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.5 
V. 
Interaction 
Effect Alone PRIDIT*Schooling 0.34 0.12 0.2 0.66 0.19 0.06 
 
z 9.03 7.3 4.35 9.91 14.25 5.01 
  Hansen J p 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.95 0.21 0.06 
 
Notes: For sample size see Table 1. A complete set of coefficient estimates is provided in Appendix B. 
Pension density is included in the estimates as proportion between 0 and 1 but the coefficient estimate is 
multiplied by 100 in this table to be of the same magnitude as the other coefficient estimates. Other 
control variables include age, age squared, male, years of exposure to school vouchers when of school 
age, AFP marketing efforts, family background, and risk aversion. “z” refers to z-statistic; see text. 
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Table 6. Predicted Change in Measured Outcomes for Correct Answer to Financial 
Literacy Question  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
($000) 
Housing 
Wealth 
($000) 
Other 
Wealth 
($000) 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
($000) 
Pension 
Density 
(% pts) 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money      
(% pts) 
        Core HRS Questions:       
(1) 
If the chance of catching an 
illness is 10%, how many 
people out of 1000 would 
get the illness? 
1.2 0.4 1.6 3.1 0.7 0.11 
(2) 
If 5 people share winning 
lottery tickets and the total 
prize is 2 Million pesos, how 
much would each receive? 
1.1 0.4 1.5 2.9 0.6 0.10 
(3) 
Assume that you have $100 
in a savings account and the 
interest rate you earn on this 
money is 2% a year. If you 
keep this money in the 
account for 5 years, how 
much would you have after 
5 years? 
1.1 0.3 1.4 2.9 0.6 0.10 
Sophisticated HRS:       
(4) 
Assume that you have $200 
in a savings account, and the 
interest rate that you earn on 
these savings is 10% a year. 
How much would you have 
in the account after 2 years? 
0.6 0.2 0.7 1.5 0.3 0.05 
(5) 
Assume that you have $100 
in a savings account and the 
interest rate that you earn on 
these savings is 1% a year. 
Inflation is 2% a year. After 
one year, if you withdraw 
the money from the savings 
account you could buy 
more/less/the same? 
0.8 0.2 1.0 2.1 0.4 0.07 
(6) 
T/F: Buying shares in one 
company is less risky than 
buying shares from many 
different companies with the 
same money. 
0.8 0.3 1.1 2.1 0.5 0.07 
Note: The table presents simulated marginal effects of increasing the probability of answering each 
question correctly by a quarter standard deviation (Table 2 indicates mean responses) on outcomes, 
holding population responses to other questions constant. 
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Appendix A:  Complete Set of OLS Coefficient Estimates for Table 4* 
 
 Components of Wealth 
 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT 
Index 
Alone PRIDIT 1.46 0.49 0.62 2.57 0.91 0.51 
 
Male 15.74 -3.18 0.18 12.95 19.22 2.27 
 
Age 4.63 -0.09 1.38 5.52 2.36 0.65 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -3.99 -1.17 -3.43 -8.18 0.90 -0.14 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.55 0.27 0.38 1.15 0.98 0.02 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 5.13 1.10 5.09 10.84 4.05 0.13 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.52 0.87 0.69 2.05 0.00 -0.03 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.48 0.79 1.31 2.58 -0.15 0.03 
 
Poor economic background  -21.54 -1.14 0.76 -22.18 -36.35 -2.17 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -4.84 -4.62 -7.20 -16.90 -5.33 0.08 
 
Constant -90.09 3.46 -47.90 -127.14 -22.22 -11.80 
II. 
Schooling 
Alone Schooling 3.89 1.70 2.01 7.59 1.76 0.80 
 
Male 19.70 -1.81 1.86 19.75 21.34 3.40 
 
Age 4.02 -0.21 1.25 5.05 2.30 0.64 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.29 -0.62 -2.79 -5.71 1.47 0.15 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.42 0.22 0.32 0.96 0.99 0.03 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.01 0.75 4.70 9.46 3.88 0.08 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.04 0.61 0.39 0.97 -0.18 -0.08 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.16 0.61 1.10 1.87 -0.22 0.02 
 
Poor economic background  -19.68 0.30 2.31 -17.07 -36.27 -2.50 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 0.62 -1.88 -4.04 -5.30 -3.22 0.87 
  Constant -121.33 -12.29 -66.67 -200.30 -41.48 -21.24 
III. Both 
PRIDIT 
and 
Schooling PRIDIT 0.81 0.17 0.25 1.23 0.69 0.44 
 
Schooling 3.07 1.53 1.75 6.35 1.06 0.36 
 
Male 18.02 -2.16 1.35 17.21 19.93 2.51 
 
Age 3.97 -0.22 1.23 4.98 2.26 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.62 -0.69 -2.89 -6.21 1.19 -0.03 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.39 0.21 0.31 0.91 0.96 0.01 
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Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 3.93 0.74 4.68 9.35 3.82 0.04 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.05 0.61 0.39 0.94 -0.19 -0.09 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.09 0.60 1.08 1.77 -0.28 -0.01 
 
Poor economic background  -18.28 0.59 2.74 -14.95 -35.09 -1.75 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 0.39 -1.93 -4.11 -5.65 -3.42 0.73 
  Constant -109.59 -9.81 -63.05 -182.45 -31.53 -14.97 
IV. Linear 
and 
Interaction 
Effects PRIDIT -0.32 -0.87 -1.17 -2.36 1.50 0.29 
 
Schooling 3.14 1.59 1.84 6.56 1.01 0.37 
 
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.33 -0.07 0.01 
 
Male 17.98 -2.21 1.29 17.05 19.96 2.50 
 
Age 3.94 -0.25 1.19 4.88 2.28 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.25 -0.35 -2.42 -5.02 0.92 0.02 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.35 0.18 0.27 0.79 0.99 0.00 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.13 0.92 4.93 9.97 3.68 0.07 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.10 0.56 0.33 0.79 -0.16 -0.10 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.05 0.56 1.03 1.63 -0.24 -0.02 
 
Poor economic background  -19.51 -0.54 1.16 -18.89 -34.18 -1.91 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 0.42 -1.90 -4.07 -5.54 -3.44 0.73 
 
Constant -109.92 -10.12 -63.48 -183.52 -31.28 -15.02 
V. 
Interaction 
Effect 
Alone PRIDIT*Schooling 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.04 
 Male 15.97 -3.33 -0.04 12.60 19.59 2.32 
 Age 4.22 -0.11 1.35 5.45 2.38 0.65 
 Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 Risk averse -3.13 -1.00 -3.22 -7.35 1.10 0.01 
 Voucher exposure primary ages 0.47 0.25 0.35 1.06 1.00 0.01 
 Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 No AFP activities 4.95 1.18 5.18 11.31 4.30 0.24 
 Mother schooling attainment 0.46 0.84 0.64 1.94 0.03 -0.03 
 Father schooling attainment 0.46 0.76 1.26 2.47 -0.10 0.03 
 Poor economic background  -23.71 -1.58 0.26 -25.02 -37.96 -2.90 
 Worked when <15 years of age -5.33 -4.55 -7.07 -16.95 -5.81 -0.05 
  Constant -82.94 3.99 -47.08 -126.02 -23.91 -12.08 
 Note: *italics indicate significance at 5% level or better. See also Table 4. 
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Appendix B:  Complete Set of IV Estimates for Table 5; first-stage estimates and 
diagnostics, and second-stage estimates and diagnostics* 
 
 Components of Wealth 
  
    
Pension  
Wealth 
Housing 
Wealth 
Other 
Wealth 
Total 
Net 
Wealth 
Pension 
Density 
Calculated 
Retirement 
Money 
I. PRIDIT 
Index 
Alone PRIDIT 3.23 1.14 1.83 6.20 1.88 0.62 
 
Male 12.66 -4.30 -1.91 6.44 17.54 2.09 
 
Age 4.32 -0.22 1.12 5.22 2.19 0.63 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -4.19 -1.23 -3.56 -8.99 0.79 -0.15 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.38 0.20 0.27 0.86 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.43 0.83 4.57 9.83 3.66 0.09 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.08 0.71 0.38 1.18 -0.25 -0.05 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.01 0.62 0.99 1.62 -0.40 0.01 
 
Poor economic background  -15.08 1.17 5.18 -8.72 -32.83 -1.79 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.50 -3.67 -5.01 -10.17 -3.51 0.28 
 
Constant -77.73 8.15 -38.71 -108.28 -15.48 -11.08 
 
Hansen J p 0.35 0.40 0.09 0.14 0.96 0.29 
II. 
Schooling 
Alone Schooling 5.55 1.98 2.66 10.18 3.23 1.12 
 
Male 19.95 -1.73 2.08 20.30 21.78 3.50 
 
Age 4.22 -0.25 1.12 5.09 2.13 0.61 
 
Age-squared -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -2.21 -0.53 -2.58 -5.32 1.95 0.24 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.38 0.20 0.29 0.88 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 3.98 0.66 4.47 9.11 3.40 -0.02 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.38 0.55 0.24 0.41 -0.51 -0.16 
 
Father schooling attainment -0.14 0.56 0.99 1.42 -0.49 -0.03 
 
Poor economic background  -16.27 0.81 3.57 -11.90 -33.51 -1.89 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 4.51 -1.50 -2.67 0.34 0.00 1.57 
 
Constant -140.83 -14.26 -70.93 -226.01 -52.21 -23.58 
  Hansen J p 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 
III. Both 
PRIDIT 
and 
Schooling PRIDIT 3.40 1.06 4.46 8.93 1.94 0.31 
 
Schooling -0.34 0.14 -5.05 -5.25 -0.12 0.58 
 
Male 12.25 -4.13 -8.01 0.11 17.39 2.79 
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Age 4.33 -0.22 1.26 5.36 2.19 0.62 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 
Risk averse -4.31 -1.18 -5.33 -10.83 0.75 0.05 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.39 0.20 0.30 0.89 0.89 0.01 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.46 0.82 5.11 10.38 3.67 0.02 
 
Mother schooling attainment 0.11 0.70 0.88 1.69 -0.23 -0.11 
 
Father schooling attainment 0.03 0.61 1.21 1.85 -0.40 -0.02 
 
Poor economic background  -15.09 1.18 5.12 -8.79 -32.84 -1.78 
 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.90 -3.50 -11.08 -16.47 -3.66 0.98 
 
Constant -74.03 6.58 16.60 -50.84 -14.12 -17.47 
  Hansen J p 0.26 0.30 0.82 0.34 0.92 0.26 
IV. Linear 
and 
Interaction 
Effects PRIDIT -2.28 -1.51 0.28 -3.51 2.15 2.19 
 
Schooling 2.44 1.40 -3.01 0.82 -0.23 -0.34 
 
PRIDIT*Schooling 0.44 0.20 0.33 0.97 -0.02 -0.15 
 
Male 14.32 -3.19 -6.48 4.65 17.31 2.11 
 
Age 4.06 -0.34 1.06 4.79 2.20 0.70 
 
Age-squared -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 
 
Risk averse -1.91 -0.09 -3.57 -5.57 0.66 -0.75 
 
Voucher exposure primary ages 0.17 0.11 0.14 0.42 0.90 0.08 
 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
No AFP activities 4.88 1.01 5.42 11.30 3.66 -0.12 
 
Mother schooling attainment -0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48 -0.21 0.07 
 
Father schooling attainment -0.38 0.43 0.91 0.96 -0.38 0.12 
 
Poor economic background  -18.83 -0.52 2.36 -17.00 -32.70 -0.54 
 
Worked when <15 years of age 2.09 -1.69 -8.14 -7.74 -3.80 -0.34 
 
Constant -99.93 -5.14 -2.47 -107.54 -13.18 -8.88 
 
Hansen J p 0.41 0.39 0.86 0.92 0.85 0.50 
V. 
Interaction 
Effect 
Alone PRIDIT*Schooling 0.34 0.12 0.20 0.66 0.19 0.06 
 Male 11.71 -4.64 -2.67 4.40 17.11 2.03 
 Age 4.18 -0.26 1.01 4.93 2.12 0.62 
 Age-squared -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
 Risk averse -3.11 -0.85 -2.92 -6.88 1.41 0.04 
 Voucher exposure primary ages 0.23 0.15 0.17 0.55 0.81 -0.01 
 Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 No AFP activities 4.97 1.02 4.86 10.85 3.99 0.20 
 Mother schooling attainment -0.13 0.64 0.23 0.74 -0.35 -0.07 
 Father schooling attainment -0.20 0.54 0.83 1.17 -0.51 -0.01 
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 Poor economic background  -18.00 0.16 3.83 -14.01 -34.69 -2.51 
 Worked when <15 years of age -1.02 -3.49 -4.51 -9.03 -3.35 0.24 
 Constant -74.43 9.35 -35.96 -101.04 -14.03 -10.94 
  Hansen J p 0.53 0.52 0.39 0.95 0.21 0.06 
 
 
  
Notes: also Table 4. 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
  
42 
 
Appendix Table B. First Stage Estimates 
      PRIDIT Index Schooling PRIDIT*Schooling 
    Male 1.77 -0.25 19.87 
Age 0.07 0.09 1.22 
Age-squared 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Risk averse 0.17 -0.25 -1.65 
Voucher exposure primary ages -0.04 0.03 0.13 
Number of agents 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No AFP activities 0.04 0.18 -1.28 
Mother schooling attainment 0.17 0.18 2.31 
Father schooling attainment 0.19 0.13 2.50 
Poor economic background  -2.96 -1.51 -20.16 
Worked when <15 years of age -1.41 -1.90 -15.13 
Primary school urban 2.92 2.32 20.18 
Unemployment rate at age 16 -6.21 -1.32 -58.02 
Think I am a Failure 0.08 0.12 1.87 
Can Do Well As Others 0.46 0.19 4.05 
Positive Attitude about Self 0.28 0.16 1.91 
Like More Self Respect 0.04 -0.14 -2.06 
Postive Self Esteem (Sum) 0.10 0.01 1.36 
Negative Self Esteem (Sum) -0.58 -0.24 -6.04 
Constant -3.25 8.11 -31.71 
    F test stat: 156.56 215.57 109.72 
Angrist-Pischke multivariate F stat:  
       III. Both PRIDIT and Schooling 17.19 24.58 
 IV. Linear and Interaction Effects 2.32 19.05 3.16 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat: 
       III. Both PRIDIT and Schooling 15.77 
  IV. Linear and Interaction Effects 9.43     
Note: *italics indicate significance at 5% level or better 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
